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Recent Developments

Long v. State:
Courts Cannot Modify a Consent Order Without Giving the Parties an
Opportunity to Be Heard Because to Do Otherwise Would Violate the Parties'
Right to Due Process
By: Dawn A. Anderson

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that courts
cannot modify a consent order without
giving the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard because to
do otherwise would violate the
parties' right to due process. Long
v. State, 371 Md 72, 807 A.2d 1
(2002). In so holding, the court
reinforced the effect of a consent
order by requiring that court ordered
modifications occur only after the
parties are given a full opportunity to
be heard on the matter.
Derrick Long, Sr. was ordered
to pay $25 per week child support
for his daughter. Long neglected to
comply with the order and failed to
appear for the hearing addressing his
neglect to provide child support.
Pursuant to Md. Rule 15-207(e), the
state filed a petition for contempt in
the circuit court. At the contempt
hearing, evidence showed Long failed
to pay any support or arrearage
resulting in back owed support of
$2975.00. Longc1aimedjailandjob
problems caused non-payment,
however the trial court found no
legitimate reason to prevent Long from
working. The court also found that
Long had no personal assets of any
kind.
The Circuit Court for
Washington County found Long in
contempt from May 1999 through

September 1999 and ordered Long
imprisoned pending payment of$700
to purge the contempt. Long
appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. In addition,
Long and the state filed ajoint motion
to vacate the sentence arguing that the
state could not sanction him with
incarceration because he had no ability
to pay the purge amount required to
release him from incarceration. The
parties attached a consent order to the
motion, stating that the sentence was
to be vacated and Long was to be
released. The order did not provide
for remand for further consideration.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland vacated the contempt
charge, but remanded the case to the
Circuit Court for Washington County,
to determine what, if any, conditions
of release reasonably assured the
petitioner's appearance at further
proceedings. Long and the State appealed the ruling, alleging that the
court abused its discretion by
modifying the agreed upon consent
order resulting in a material change.
In a joint motion to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, the parties
claimed that the intermediate court
erred in modifying the consent order,
thereby making the order adverse to
the intent of the parties. Long
contended that the court's actions
deprived the parties the benefit oftheir

bargain, and that in holding as it did,
the intermediate court deprived the
parties oftheir right to litigate through
briefing and oral arguments on merits.
Finally, Long asserted that, according
to Md. Rule 15-207(e), he could not
be incarcerated pending a hearing
because he had no ability to purge
himself ofthe contempt.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland first examined consent
orders generally, defining them as
hybrids that combine contract law
and judicial decrees. Id at 82, 807
A.2d at 7. Consent orders memorialize an agreement of parties who
relinquish the right to litigate the matter
in exchange for a certain, carefully
negotiated, outcome. Id The court
noted that consent orders have the
"same force and effect as any other
judgments.... " Id. (citing Jones,
356 Md. 513, 740 A.2d 1004
(1999».
The court further explained that
the parties define the scope of a
consent agreement. Therefore, a
court must first look to the agreement
to interpret it. Long, 371 Md. at 83,
807 A.2d at 7. The court noted that
when interpreting a consent order the
objective test of contracts applies.
Id at 84, 807 A.2d at 8. The court
must consider "[t]he written language
... , irrespective of the intent ofthe
parties ... , unless the written
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language is not susceptible ofclear and
definite understanding, or unless there
is fraud, duress, or mutual mistake."
Id The court further noted that public
policy dictates that consent orders be
accepted because "law favors
compromise and amicable
adjustments." Id. (quoting Sisson
v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 83 (1879)).
The court continued by
addressing whether the intermediate
court erred in modifying the consent
order. Id. at 81, 807 A.2d at 7. The
court reiterated the general rule that
consent orders cannot be modified by
the court; they should be accepted or
denied as proposed. Long, 371 Md.
at 87, 807 A.2d at 10. Courts may
suggest modifications and allow the
parties to amend the consent order on
their own. In addition, the court stated
that when a court modifies a consent
order an appeal is allowable. Id.
The court further stated that,
generally, parties cannot appeal a
consent order after it has been
accepted by the court. Id at 86, 807
A.2d at 9. Parties who enter into a
consent order agree to give up legal
rights to litigate the matter. Id.
However, a court's refusal to enter
consent is reviewable for abuse of
discretion. Id.
In applying these principles, the
court observed that the proposed
consent order provided that Long's
sentence be vacated and had no
provision for remand to the circuit
court. Long, 371 Md. at 88, 807
A.2d at 10. The court of special
appeals modified the order by
remanding the case to the circuit court
and SUbjecting Long to incarceration
without an opportunity to be heard.
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Id. at 89, 807 A.2d at 11. In acknowledging the intermediate court's
attempt to ensure Long's appearance
at future hearings, the court ofappeals
indicated that the parties could have
included provisions to secure Long's
appearance at further proceedings in
their agreement. The court cannot
materially modify the existing
agreement and alter the bargain ofthe
parties. Id.
The court noted that while it is
greatly concerned over Long's failure
to pay child support, the ultimate goal
is not to punish parents, but to provide
support for children. Id. at 92, 807
A.2d at 13. The court held that the
court of special appeals erred in
modifying the consent order without
giving the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and
remanded the case in part. Id.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has reinforced Maryland
law dealing with consent orders. This
reinforcement continues to support the
strength and weight ofconsent orders.
Consent orders should be given
reverence by the courts when the
order does not violate fairness and is
reasonable. Courts can still accept
or reject a proposed order; however,
courts seeking to modify a consent
order must give the parties notice and
allow them an opportunity to be heard
This supports the constitutional
protection of parties. Further,
judgments that modify consent orders
without these protections will be
subject to reversal on appeal. The
strictness and inflexibility ofconsent
orders suggests that parties, and
therefore their attorneys, must be very
precise in drafting. This holding

protects the parties' rights to agree to
settle a civil matter, coinciding with
public policy.
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